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certainty and clarity on the side of soft law with uncertainty and indeterminacy on 
the side of hard law. Unfortunately, the codification undertaken at the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) not only did not solve the hard law 
uncertainties, but also enlarged the cleavage between the perspectives of weak and 
strong States regarding international relations. By combining legal positivism with 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), this paper suggests that (i) 
the way Article 52 of the VCLT was drafted had the effect of undermining the concept 
of consent and paving the way for the entrenchment of power politics, and (ii) that 
there is some elbow room for trying to consolidate a wider interpretation of the Article. 
Such an interpretation would allow us to condemn economic and political pressures 
that amount to true coercion as illegal strategies in treaty negotiations, safeguarding 
weaker States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The validity of treaties concluded under the influence of non-military 
coercion is still a sensitive theme in international law. The International Law 
Commission (ILC) did not come to a lasting solution to this question, despite 
it having been analyzed by different Rapporteurs, over a span of nearly 20 
years. In the end, explicit reference to non-military coercion was simply 
excluded from the express wording of Article 52 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The drafting history of Article 
52 is marked by a clear opposition. On the one hand, many countries, mostly 
from the (Global) South,1 intended to expand its scope in order to expressly 
include economic and political coercion as grounds of the invalidity of 
treaties. On the other hand, many Northern countries feared that an 
expanded reading of coercion would open the door to arbitrary allegations. 
Each side tried its best to arm itself with legal arguments – the latter group 
maintained that the use of economic and political influence amounted to 
nothing more than mere pressure, while the former depicted it as a way to 
depart from customary law constraints and to surreptitiously force peripheral 
States into contradicting their true will.  
The difficulties faced by international lawyers when dealing with this issue 
become clear when we analyze certain instances of political and economic 
influence at the international level. Numerous soft law instruments condemn 
economic and political coercion as undue interference in internal affairs.2 On 
                                                 
1 In this brief paper, I will not offer a deep insight into the reach of notions such as 
the 'Third World' and the 'South', terminologies that are well-addressed by many 
TWAILers. However, I do suggest that TWAIL use these concepts as open-ended 
tools, not necessarily determined by geographical considerations. These notions 
encompass common sensitivities felt by States and groups who suffer from 
relationships based on domination and powerlessness. For a self-critical analysis of 
TWAIL on this matter, see Amar Bhatia, 'The South of the North: Building on 
Critical Approaches to International Law with Lessons from the Fourth World' 
(2012) 14 Oregon Review International Law 131. 
2 UNGA Res 2131 (21 December 1965) UN Doc A/RES/20/2131; UNGA Res 2625 (24 
October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625; UNGA Res 3201 (1 May 1974) UN Doc 
A/RES/S-6/3201; UNGA Res 3281 (12 December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/29/3281; 
UNGA Res 42/173 (11 December 1987) UN Doc A/RES/42/173; UNGA Res 64/189 
(21 December 2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/189. 
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the other hand, when it comes to hard law, customary and conventional law 
are still unclear on the limits of economic and political coercion.3 Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos suggests that there is no customary rule on the right to be free 
from economic coercion, however desirable it would be. This absence can be 
explained by two reasons. First, it is a hard task to compile evidence of 
practice and opinio juris in support of a right to be free from economic 
coercion. Second, it is difficult to draw a clear line between pressure and 
coercion.4 Yet, be this as it may, the social consequences which result from 
political and economic coercion during treaty negotiations are highly visible. 
Some examples, among many others, illustrate this: The United States used 
their economic leverage to affect Central American countries' foreign policy 
during the 1970s and Russia, during the Georgian-Russian crisis, issued 
embargos as soon as Georgia announced that it would take further steps to 
join NATO. 
Many Third World countries are particularly affected by certain forms of 
non-military coercion. For example, food security is a sensitive theme in the 
international arena for India, as the country is highly dependent on a complex 
and fragile network of internal and international suppliers to provide food to 
its population. The Greek sovereign debt crisis illustrates a case of economic 
coercion. The Greek government, threatened by a constrained access to 
liquidity, was pushed into accepting a reinforced regime of conditionalities, 
which would not be voted favorably under regular democratic processes. 
Moreover, institutionalized action like the 'Oil-for-Food Programme'5 
evinces that even economic sanctions and countermeasures applied to 
enforce international law have their risks and must be cautiously planned in 
order not to reinforce distributive inequalities. Because economic measures 
carry risks, grave economic coercion – understood as a practice that is 
unrelated to the implementation of a legal obligation – should definitely not 
be tolerated.  
                                                 
3 Barry E Carter, 'Economic Coercion', MPEPIL (September 2009) <http://opil.oup 
law.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1518> 
accessed 31 March 2017. 
4 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 'The Right to Be Free From Economic Coercion' (2015) 
4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 616.  
5 UNSC Res 986 (14 April 1995) UN Doc S/RES/986. 
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This article sketches a TWAIL critique of how the VCLT regards coercion 
of the State as a ground of the invalidity of treaties. It is divided in four parts. 
First, I will describe and analyze the drafting history of Article 52 of the 
VCLT – that deals with the ground of invalidity – both within the ILC and 
at the 1968/69 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, in order to evince 
the underlying North/South tensions therein. Next, I will describe and 
emphasize how the choice made by the ILC to favor codification in spite of 
progressive development stands out as a political choice that bears political 
consequences, drawing upon reflections from critical legal scholars. Then, I 
will present some TWAIL readings on the pervasive colonialism in 
international law as a framework for understanding the consequences of a 
narrow reading of Article 52. Finally, I will offer some concluding remarks, 
pointing out that there exists some leeway for consolidating non-military 
coercion as effective grounds of the invalidity of treaties, linked specifically 
to parallel procedures and treaty interpretation and that TWAILers should 
explore this leeway.  
II. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF ARTICLE 52  
The ILC decided at its first session, in 1949, to award priority to the 
codification and progressive development of the law of treaties. Mr. James 
Brierly was named the first Special Rapporteur. At the Second Session of the 
ILC (1950), he submitted a Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
presented a selection of alternative proposals on this subject-matter.6 Only 
two proposals presented by James Brierly included rules on the effects of 
threats or violence over consent to enter into a treaty: Bluntschli's and Fiore's 
Draft Codes, both written in the second half of the 19th century. The 
Rapporteur's Draft did not elaborate on this issue. Bluntschli's proposal 
stated that free will did not exist if the representatives of the state were 
'subjected to violence or to grave and immediate threats' (Articles 408-409).7 
Fiore's proposal considered that duress8 was a ground of invalidity when the 
                                                 
6 ILC, 'Report on the Law of Treaties by J.L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur' (14 April 
1950) UN Doc A/CN.4/23.  
7 Ibid 246. 
8 Despite the existing differences in other contexts, duress and coercion were used 
interchangeably during the discussions on grounds of the invalidity of treaties. 
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State was subjected to 'physical violence' or when its representatives were led 
to act based on 'external constraint'. Such external constraint needed to be 
capable of depriving them 'of all deliberation and freedom of judgment' 
(Article 758).9 
The validity of treaties concluded under coercion was only addressed directly 
by Brierly's successor, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. In Lauterpacht's first Report 
on the Law of Treaties,10 presented at the Fifth Session of the ILC (1953), a 
provision concerning the coercion of the State was written as follows:  
Article 12. Absence of compulsion 
Treaties imposed by or as the result of the use of force or threats of force 
against a State in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations are invalid if so declared by the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any State.11 
Nearly thirty years before, in Private Law Analogies, Lauterpacht had 
defended that the use of force and threats of force did not vitiate consent to 
enter into a treaty because of the underdevelopment of international law, 
rather than the intrinsic adequacy of these means. The use of force and 
threats of force were a malum necessarium caused by the imperfect structure of 
the legal sanction in international law and the unorganized character of 
international society. Their use was widespread and they were accepted as 
general instruments of international relations, encompassing even treaty 
negotiations. However, for Lauterpacht, if ever there was a change in political 
                                                 
Both expressions described a circumstance in which a 'threat or actual harm' was 
posed against the State or its representatives, so that whoever acted under duress 
or coercion did not voluntarily agree to the treaty, but was effectively and 
unwillingly forced to enter into it. Some Rapporteurs and experts opted for duress, 
while others preferred coercion, but it is not possible to identify fundamental 
differences in the travaux préparatoires. Resort to the authentic texts of the VCLT 
in different languages reinforces this perception. When we compare the final 
versions of Article 52 in English, Spanish and French, each one resorts to terms that 
are not exact and straightforward translations, despite expressing similar ideas: 
'coercion', 'coacción' and 'contrainte'. 
9 ILC, 'Report' (n 6) 247. 
10 ILC, 'Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur' 
(24 March 1953) UN Doc A/CN.4/63. 
11 Ibid 93. 
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will, international law could effectively impose constraints on violent actions. 
Such development would be positive for the law of treaties, as it would allow 
for the consolidation of true consent as the basis of treaty law, instead of 
fictitious consent – plugging some holes linked to the previously imperfect 
private law analogy.12  
As Special Rapporteur, Lauterpacht identified that this development had 
already taken place. He affirmed that the legal situation had significantly 
changed since 1928 (and after the presentation of his doctoral thesis). Firstly, 
the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War outlawed aggressive war and 
the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. Then, the Charter of the 
United Nations limited the use of force between its members. Once the 
prohibition of the unauthorized use of force took shape as a rule of customary 
international law, many countries issued declarations against the recognition 
of treaties resulting from the unlawful use of force.13  
For Lauterpacht, the newly imposed limits on the use of force and threats of 
force meant that the field was wide open for coercion to take hold as a ground 
of the invalidity of treaties. Whilst designing Article 12, he put the proposal 
from The Function of Law in the International Community14 into practice – 
indicating that questions related to coercion should be subjected to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ 
would act as a safeguard against baseless and arbitrary allegations of coercion, 
which would possibly encompass both direct physical force and forceful 
menaces: 
The article refers to physical force or threats of physical force as 
distinguished from coercion not amounting to physical force. However, in 
the case of a State the borderline between these two kinds of coercion is not 
rigid. In fact, it would appear that direct physical force can be applied only to 
persons, but not to the collective entity of the State. On the other hand, in 
                                                 
12 Hersch Lauterpacht, 'Private Law Analogies in International Law' (PhD thesis, 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 1926) 70-77 <http:/etheses. 
lse.ac.uk/664/>, accessed 31 March 2017. In his thesis, Lauterpacht only refers to 
'duress' as a ground of the invalidity of treaties alongside 'error' and 'fraud', making 
no reference to 'coercion', the expression he favored as Rapporteur. 
13 ILC, 'Report' (n 10) 147-152. 
14 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (first 
published 1933, Oxford University Press 2011) 431-434. 
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cases such as attempts or threats to starve a State into submission by cutting 
off its imports or its access to the sea, although no physical force is used 
directly against persons it may be difficult to deny that the treaty must be 
deemed to have been concluded as the result of the use of force or threats of 
force.15   
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the third Special Rapporteur, in his third Report on 
the Law of Treaties,16 presented at the tenth session of the ILC (1958), denied 
that duress could affect a State. According to him, duress would only be 
forbidden by international law when it amounts to a direct physical or mental 
threat against representatives of the State. Interestingly enough, Fitzmaurice 
also based himself on a private law analogy to defend this exclusion. In private 
law, he argued, the question of the validity of contracts is solved with 
reference to 'individual conscience', as individuals are the only ones who can 
represent or misrepresent things. According to Fitzmaurice, corporate 
responsibility has nothing to do with 'corporate consent', but deals merely 
with questions of entitlement – the definition of who is capable to act in the 
name of the corporation. As such, corporate entities could hardly be the 
object of coercion; the only way coercion could take place is through their 
representatives being forced to act against their will.17 Hence, for him, 
traditional international law had correctly repudiated duress as grounds of 
invalidity applied directly to States. Article 14 of his draft treaty clearly 
reveals his position by focusing on the representatives of the State rather than 
on the State: 
Article 14. Duress 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 5 below, the conclusion of a 
treaty brought about by duress or coercion, whether physical or mental, 
actual or threatened, employed directly and specifically against the persons, 
of the individual agents, plenipotentiaries, authorities or members of organs 
engaged in negotiating or signing, or ratifying or acceding to, or any other act 
of participation in a treaty, vitiates the consent apparently given, and 
invalidates the act concerned, and consequently the treaty. 
                                                 
15 ILC, 'Report' (n 10) 149. 
16 ILC, 'Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special 
Rapporteur' (18 March 1958) UN Doc A/CN.4/115. 
17 Ibid 38-39. 
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[…] 
4. Duress for the purposes of the present article means duress addressed to 
the persons concerned, as individuals, or as members of the negotiating, 
ratifying or acceding body or organ, and directed to securing the 
performance of the act of participation. Duress is not constituted by the 
threat of the consequences that will or may ensue for the State of which those 
persons are nationals, in the event of their non-compliance (or for themselves 
as nationals of that State), nor by their fear of such consequences, nor by the 
existence of any indirect threat to themselves or their relatives or 
dependents that may arise from the possibility of such consequences.18 
Sir Humphrey Waldock, the fourth and final Special Rapporteur, devoted 
meticulous attention to this theme in his Second Report on the Law of 
Treaties,19 presented at the fifteenth session of the ILC (1963). Because of 
diverging opinions from previous Special Rapporteurs, Waldock decided to 
approach coercion in two different articles of Part II of his draft treaty, which 
respectively dealt with coercion of representatives (Article 11) and coercion 
of the State (Article 12).  
In Article 11, Waldock opted for a broad definition of coercion. Coercion 
against the representatives may be 'actual or threatened, physical or mental, 
with respect to their persons or to matters of personal concern'.20 Waldock 
explained that the reference to 'mental coercion' intended to account for all 
acts that fall outside the scope of the use of physical violence. Besides, he 
pointed out that the reference to 'matters of personal concern' intended to 
account for acts that targeted persons who are close to the representative, 
not only him or herself. He affirmed that international practice provided 
many examples of treaties that could be annulled due to the coercion suffered 
by the representative of the State: Japanese pressure on the Emperor of 
Korea in 1905, North American pressure on the Haitian National Assembly 
in 1915, and German pressure on the President and the Foreign Minister of 
Czechoslovakia in 1939.21 In the final text of the VCLT, Waldock's division 
into two different articles was kept, but Article 51, which now deals with the 
                                                 
18 ILC, 'Third Report' (n 16) 26. 
19 ILC, 'Second report on the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur' (20 March 1963) UN Doc A/CN.4/156. 
20 Ibid 50. 
21 Ibid 50-51. 
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coercion of a representative of a State, unfortunately lost all minutiae 
proposed by the Special Rapporteur, not mentioning coercion to persons 
who are close to the representative nor making the reference to 'mental 
coercion' explicit. 
Regarding Article 12, unlike Fitzmaurice, Waldock recognized the 
possibility for a State to be directly coerced. Waldock reaffirmed 
Lauterpacht's idea that the invalidity of treaties concluded as a result of a 
State's coercion was lex lata. However, he also took into consideration 
Fitzmaurice's concern for the effectiveness of pacta sunt servanda if the 
grounds of invalidity were too broad. Waldock's middle-ground solution was 
to take a conservative stance. He limited the scope of the clause only to 
encompass the illegal use of physical force that could amount to military 
coercion. Besides, he added a 'procedural brake': after coercion had ceased, 
the State was only entitled to declare it void if it had never consented to its 
application: 
[…] if 'coercion' were to be regarded as extending to other forms of pressure 
upon a State, to political or economic pressure, the door to the evasion of 
treaty obligations might be opened very wide; for these forms of 'coercion' 
are much less capable of definition and much more liable to subjective 
appreciations. Moreover, the operation of political and economic pressures 
is part of the normal working of the relations between States, and 
international law does not yet seem to contain the criteria necessary for 
formulating distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of such 
forms of pressure as a means of securing consent to treaties. Accordingly, 
while accepting the view that some forms of 'unequal' treaty brought about 
by coercion of the State must be regarded as lacking essential validity, the 
Special Rapporteur feels that it would be unsafe in the present state of 
international law to extend the notion of 'coercion' beyond the illegal use or 
threat of force.22 
Waldock's Draft Articles, adopted provisionally by the ILC in 1965, were 
sent to governments for commentaries, in accordance with the Statute of the 
Commission. The ILC discussed them during the seventeenth session, which 
was conducted in two parts (1965/66) due to the heavy workload. Discussions 
on the validity of treaties were held in 1966 and were summarized in 
                                                 
22 ILC, 'Second Report' (n 19) 52. 
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Waldock's Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties.23 Article 36 of the 1965 Draft 
Articles had the following wording on the coercion of the State: 
Article 36. Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force  
Any treaty the conclusion of which was procured by the threat or use of force 
in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations shall be 
void.24  
On the one hand, many countries in the so-called global periphery considered 
the scope adopted by the Special Rapporteur to be too narrow, and called for 
the inclusion of other forms of coercion. The Communist bloc – alongside 
some African nations –reiterated its post-war political stance25 against 
leonine treaties that link former dependent territories to their colonial 
authorities and disregard assertions of self-determination.  
On the other hand, delegates from the Netherlands, the United States and 
the United Kingdom opposed proposals for the inclusion of non-military 
force as a form of coercion. They affirmed that: (i) such an inclusion would 
create uncertainties that would not only deprive the Article of all 
effectiveness, but also give rise to 'pretexts for the evasion of treaty 
obligations'; and (ii) the lex lata did not forbid the use of economic and 
political pressure. According to the Dutch representative, 'however 
reprehensible' some forms of economic or psychological coercion might be, 
the risks of drafting too broad a rule outweighed the benefits of including 
them under the single general rule prohibiting coercion.26 Some developed 
countries, like Spain, took a middle course, understanding some forms of 
non-military influence, such as 'the threat of starvation from economic 
                                                 
23 ILC, 'Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur' (15 November 1965 - 18 January 1966) UN Doc A/CN.4/183 and Add. 
1-4. 
24 ILC, 'Draft articles adopted by the Commission' (7 January 1965) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.107. 
25 For further information on this stance, see: Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (first published 1995, Cambridge University Press 2008) 
44-47.  
26 ILC, 'Fifth Report' (n 23) 16.  
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pressure', to be already prohibited by the text of Article 36, under the heading 
of 'use of force'.27 
The Special Rapporteur sided with the northern delegates, deciding that his 
proposal should remain unchanged, and as such should not to include an 
express provision on economic or political coercion. Indeed, he believed that 
the Commission's task was to codify the law of treaties by upholding the 
current doctrine on the limits of the use of force and by simply identifying 
the lex lata, which only amounted to military coercion. To appease the critics, 
he affirmed that the final formulation, based on the threat or use of force as 
defined by the principles of the UN Charter, remained sufficiently open-
ended: 
Under this general formulation the article is, as it were, open-ended: any 
interpretation of the principle that States are under an obligation to refrain 
from the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter 
which becomes generally accepted as authoritative will automatically have its 
effects on the scope of the rule laid down in the present article. On the other 
hand, if the Commission were itself to attempt to elaborate the rule 
contained in the article by detailed interpretations of the principle, it would 
encroach on a topic which has been remitted by the General Assembly to the 
Special Committee and the detailed study of which would seem to belong 
rather to the topic of State responsibility.28  
The 1966 Draft Articles, which later on served as the working text at the 
1968/69 Vienna Conference, had the following wording on coercion of the 
State:  
Article 49. Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force 
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of 
force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.29 
During the Vienna Conference, a group of 19 States from the Third World 
(Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Congo/Brazzaville, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, 
India, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tanzania, the 
United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia) proposed an amendment to 
                                                 
27 ILC, 'Fifth Report' (n 23) 18. 
28 Ibid 19. 
29 ILC, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II' UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1, 183. 
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Article 49 of the 1966 Draft Articles. Their aim was to include economic and 
political pressure within the scope of the threat or use of force: 'A treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force, 
including economic or political pressure, in violation of the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations'.30 Due to the great reluctance of some 
negotiators, especially on the part of the US representative, the alternative 
wording was not pressed to a vote, and it was alternatively proposed that a 
declaration be adopted on the theme.31 The Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties32 was the 
outcome of this process. After negotiations, Article 52 of the VCLT was then 
approved with minor changes: 
Article 52. Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force 
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of 
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
III. THE POLITICS OF CODIFICATION/PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT 
AT THE ILC 
In spite of Waldock's response that the interpretation of the notion of 
'threat or use of force' was open-ended and could change over time, one 
question looms large over the action of the ILC: why not opt for progressive 
development in drafting Article 52? The mandate of the ILC is not limited to 
the codification of international law. The ILC is also entrusted with the 
progressive development of international law.33 The Rapporteur's choice to 
                                                 
30 UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.67/Rev.1/Corr.1. Available in UN, 'Official Records of 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions 
(Documents of the Conference)' (26 March – 24 May 1968 and 9 April – 22 May 
1969) UN Doc A/CONF.39, 172.  
31 Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 642; Georges Ténékidès, 'Les effets de la contrainte sur 
les traités à la lumière de la Convention de Vienne du 23 mai 1969' (1974) 20 
Annuaire francais de droit international 79, 89-93. 
32 Doc. A/CONF.39/20. Available in UN, 'Official Records' (n 30) 285. 
33 In 1981, after a period where the ILC's usefulness was called into question due to 
the growing trend of States pursuing codification and progressive development 
through ad hoc bodies, a United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
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limit his inquiry to elements which undoubtedly formed the lex lata and not 
to encompass further developments in Article 52 stands as a political choice. 
This does not mean that this choice is inherently bad or good, but only that 
it can be linked both to a set of value-laden premises and a set of political 
consequences. When Special Rapporteurs expressly take sides with 
codification, they act in favor of the status quo – using an apologetic language 
('the law as it is') to displace further utopian projects ('the law as it should be'). 
According to Koskenniemi, codification relies on a seemingly neutral and 
objective process that is supposedly immune to political pressures, but in 
reality, it also brings about political consequences.34 
Hersch Lauterpacht, in the 1949 Survey of International Law in Relation to the 
Work of Codification of the International Law Commission,35 noted that 
codification within the ILC must not be interpreted as mere registration, or 
otherwise it would effectively act as 'a brake upon progress'.36 According to 
him, codification must entail harmonizing the available sources in order to 
achieve a systematic and comprehensive final proposal. Therefore, the ILC 
should not restrict its activities to the search for the least common 
denominator. According to Lauterpacht, existing practices should be 
considered as a whole in order to bring about a regulation which was neither 
fragmentary nor incompatible with 'a peaceful and neighbourly intercourse 
                                                 
(UNITAR) working paper made similar points to the ones I intend to raise in this 
part of the article. First, the paper identified that there were important ideological 
discrepancies within the ILC that led to it being too conservative, in such a way 
that its final drafts only reflected the minimal content of international obligations. 
Moreover, it suggested that the ILC was not giving proper attention to progressive 
development, which was all the more needed in newer international regimes that 
relied on extensive cooperation. The ILC, therefore, was traditionally resorting to 
a narrow view of codification, which led it not to address certain issues properly. 
Mohamed El Baradei, Thomas M Franck and Robert Trachtenberg, The 
International Law Commission: The Need for a New Direction, UNITAR Policy and 
Efficacy Studies no. 1 (1981).   
34 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal 
Argument (first published 1989, Cambridge University Press 2005) 20. 
35 ILC, 'Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the 
International Law Commission' (10 February 1949) UN Doc A/CN.4/1/Rev.1. 
36 Ibid 7-11. 
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of States'.37 When Special Rapporteur Waldock remarked that some 
'unequal' treaties lacked essential validity,38 but chose not to delve further 
into this, he opted for a narrow view of codification. By filtering out some 
practices, he merely consolidated certain existing situations, instead of fully 
grasping the principles underlying the rule in order to reach the protection of 
true consent. 
The final text of Article 52 of the VCLT is also hampered by the 'framing 
effect': the content of Article 52 is inherently linked to the way the issue was 
initially framed by the ILC. Discussions on the use of force are very 
important when it comes to fully grasping the idea of coercion. However, 
they are not sufficient to deal exhaustively with the issue of coercion. 
Coercion, corruption, error and fraud are linked to the duty to conduct 
negotiations in good faith.39 Whilst error and fraud deal with cases in which 
a party has imperfect will, corruption and coercion deal with cases in which a 
party goes against its own will. In coercion cases, a party contradicts its own 
will due to physical or psychological constraints imposed by the other party. 
These constraints, mainly psychological ones, are imposed by different 
means that are not adequately summarized by the idea of the use of force, 
which is linked to materialistic pressures, mainly of a military nature. The 
final wording of Article 52 of the VCLT demands the difficult process of 
translating economic menaces into the language of the use of force. Thus, it 
ignores that the reasoning in these cases may be quite different. 
Waldock's final decision to remit questions over economic coercion to the 
preferential analysis of the Special Committee on State Responsibility, under 
the heading of the limits of the use of force, does not make his position 
politically neutral. The work of the ILC on the topic of State responsibility 
was in a state of slumber since 1961. Thus, by indicating that the Special 
Committee on State Responsibility would better address these issues, 
Waldock's decision ended up 'freezing out' these controversial discussions. 
Moreover, the limits of economic and political coercion ended up not being 
properly studied by the Special Committee on State Responsibility. After 
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38 ILC, 'Second report' (n 19) 52. 
39 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(first published 1953, Cambridge University Press 2006) 106-109. 
2017} The Validity of Treaties 53 
limiting the scope of its mission to examining secondary norms, following 
Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago's proposal, the Special Committee on State 
Responsibility set aside all further discussions on the concept of the use of 
force, considered by it to be a primary norm.  
By leaving the wording of Article 52 of the VCLT interpretively open, one 
may think that the ILC created a level playing field for case-by-case 
interpretive disputes. However, the solution to leave the determination of 
other means of coercion to State practice and to case law is an imperfect 
solution. It is extremely difficult to depart from the starting point described 
by Special Rapporteur Waldock, which is not conducive to outlawing 
economic and political coercion. The procedure of Articles 65 and 66 of the 
VCLT, unlike the one proposed by Lauterpacht, is weak, as it: (i) only refers 
to Article 33 of the UN Charter on the pacific settlement of disputes and (ii) 
at most provides States with non-binding decisions by the Conciliation 
Commission, according to paragraph 6 of the Annex to the 1969 Convention. 
Moreover, one should hardly expect UN organs (and even less so the Security 
Council) to address these questions directly through an authoritative source 
and not only through soft law. 
The final decision of the Vienna Conference to condemn 'the threat or use 
of pressure in any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any State 
in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion 
of a treaty' in soft law40 does not suffice to give effect to those pressing needs. 
If it were clear, as the wording of the declaration points out, that such acts 
violate good faith and sovereign equality,41 why not strive to include them in 
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the final text? By coupling soft law with soft enforcement,42 the symbolic 
message of the declaration may only shine as fool's gold.  
IV. CREEPING COLONIALISM 
The political question which should be brought to the limelight is this: who 
is favored by the maintenance of the status quo?  
Since the 1990s, a growing body of literature on the history of international 
law has pointed out the maintenance of colonial arguments in contemporary 
international law.43 As Matthew Craven has shown, a stereotypical depiction 
of colonialism simply as colonial annexation, which was supposedly brought 
to an end by the era of decolonization, will do us no favor. Most colonial 
structures intend to keep advancing free trade and economic exploitation 
under the color of equality and objectivity. 'It is in the idea of informal empire 
[…] that a critique of colonialism might retain an enduring value for the 
current project of international law'.44  
This was also a common change for TWAILers. The transition from 
TWAIL I to TWAIL II added new layers of complexity to the depicting of 
colonial structures.45 It effected the transition from what James Thuo Gathii 
calls the weak form of anti-colonial scholarship to the strong form of anti-
colonial scholarship.46 Acquiring sovereignty was no longer seen as the final 
answer to colonialism, since informal mechanisms of empire continued to 
pervade many dealings between sovereign States.   
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Anne Orford points out that it is important to ask whether and how far the 
decolonization project has gone. Finding an answer to this question demands 
attention to the role of the past in shaping the present.47 The universalist 
project constantly rewrites its tradition and displaces its forefathers and 
turning points from one context to another. Drawing from Orford's analysis, 
one may notice that simply relying on codification and setting aside attempts 
of progressive development is a 'politics of time': it boils down to mimicking 
the past, and to fostering the project of historical continuities.  
The modernization of colonial legal technologies48 and their coupling to an 
ever-renewing universalism is also a theme of great interest to critical 
international lawyers, not necessarily linked to TWAIL scholarship. A good 
example of this is David Fidler's depicting of Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs).49 According to him, SAPs resemble the classical system of 
capitulations. Both instruments impose harmonization in order to foster a 
supposedly advantageous legal, economic and political environment, but 
essentially rely on unequal relations, which are concealed behind 
managerialism.  
Matthew Craven points out that the disappearance of the discussions 
regarding unequal treaties has had detrimental effects on our current 
understanding of international law. As a result, the responses given by the law 
of treaties to tackle those issues are insufficient.50 By restraining the 
discussions on coercion to the threat or use of force, the regime of the VCLT 
left unanswered some of the most important problems of international 
politics related to systemic inequalities and vitiated consent. Thereby, it 
crystallized the North/South cleavage. According to Craven, the analysis of 
the ICJ in the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction case constitutes another difficulty for 
the application of coercion as a ground of the invalidity of treaties. When 
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denying that the presence of naval forces off the coast of the State did not 
amount to clear evidence of a threat of the use of force, the ICJ raised the 
burden of proof to a nearly untenable standard, which is only clearly met by 
military attacks.51 The ICJ's decision to demand strict material evidence was 
especially troubling since menaces usually do not 'stay on record'. Searching 
the travaux préparatoires or diplomatic exchanges for a clear statement on the 
issue is hardly successful.  
Other of Craven's poignant reflections relate to the negative role that the 
doctrine of sovereign equality plays in the law of treaties. Indeed, a 
presumption of equality is usually positive for the implementation of the treaty, 
as it insists on charging both parties with the duty of performance, 
guaranteeing that whatever was agreed will effectively be implemented. 
However, this presumption is not particularly useful when it comes to the 
moment of the conclusion of the treaty – it is then that power relations may 
lead to abusive pressures and unwanted concessions and should therefore be 
susceptible and subject to legal analysis.52 
Stanislaw Nahlik noticed that the idea of a presumed consent was not 
definitely abandoned by the ILC in the discussions on the law of treaties.53 
According to him, Special Rapporteur Waldock waged pacta sunt servanda 
against substantive consent, giving preference to the former in spite of the 
latter. Waldock constantly emphasized the idea that invalidity is an 
exceptional condition that should not be easily summoned. Otherwise, it 
would undermine the sanctity of treaties, which is a necessary condition to 
general welfare. This inversion appears as an argumentative strategy to 
contradict the liberal postulates on which the universalist tradition rests – 
that without free consent, no obligations are born. However, this argument 
is not convincing as it does not evince which overarching principle would 
trump other forms of coercion. This tactic echoes Martti Koskenniemi's 
description of the conundrum of tacit consent: tacit or presumed consent is 
an international legal argument supposedly based on consent, but that 
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actually supports non-consensual justice.54 It may be summarized as follows: 
once the treaty is signed, we presume consent and raise the bar for displacing 
it, instead of primarily considering whether it was signed or not in free will. 
The line of reasoning followed by Special Rapporteur Waldock is quite 
similar to the one followed by the authors who defended the system of 
capitulations in international law.55 In both cases, the need to facilitate 
international relations was summoned to justify greater or lower tolerance 
towards certain practices. In the case of coercion, the 'normal working of the 
relations between States' implied that the invalidity of treaties is a last 
resource; in the case of capitulations, exceptions to the principle of 
territoriality would 'smoothen' the contacts between non-civilized and 
civilized nations. The strong presumption against invalidity and the 
preservation of sacrosanct agreements trample on the question of their 
regularity. 
To conclude this section, I will reply to the question posed at the beginning 
of it. The maintenance of the status quo, in the case of Article 52 of the VCLT, 
is beneficial to power-relations and hard power in international politics and 
supports the 'carrots and sticks' model. The lack of a definitive position on 
the limits of coercion and the idea that these grounds of invalidity should only 
be summoned as a last resource incentivize the assertion of power in treaty 
negotiations and poses weak resistance to power politics instruments.56 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The invalidity of treaties concluded under coercion must not be taken lightly, 
considering the risks that the acceptance of economic and political menaces 
as tools of negotiation brings to international relations. Many 
underdeveloped countries have a single big commercial partner who is 
capable of dictating its integration into chains of commerce, and who, by 
blocking the trade of goods with the weaker State or shunning its access to 
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international mechanisms, may lead entire populations to famine. In 
situations like this, the weak negotiating country has no alternative but to 
bow down.     
I strongly disagree with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's reasoning that private law 
analogies are not useful in the case of coercion against the State. The private 
law analogy is extremely useful to point out that international law's response 
to coercion lags far behind. Unlike international law, most national legal 
systems have already developed legal mechanisms that provide special 
protection for the weaker party in excessively unequal negotiations, 
embedding public law values in private law dealings. Labor law and consumer 
protection are great examples of these mechanisms. It is extremely 
important that we take consent seriously in international law, by outlawing 
the use of other forms of coercion in the conclusion of treaties. 
The outcome of the VCLT negotiations is tainted by the decision not to give 
proper attention to intolerable forms of coercion. As such, it perpetuates the 
mechanisms of informal empire. The final choice to assert that alternative 
forms of pressure can be detrimental to good faith and sovereign equality 
through a soft law instrument, that is, the Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, provides 
only a minor silver lining to the issue.57  
As true as these criticisms may be, they do not answer the question of what 
to do next. TWAILers often face the 'chicken or egg dilemma': should they 
abandon the whole system due to its problems or should they try to work 
within the system in order to enhance it? This brings to the fore an already 
well-established criticism: the first TWAILers generally chose the latter 
option and were often accused by their younger peers of being too 
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mainstream and optimistic in that regard; at the same time, many recent 
TWAILers fall prey to launching empty criticism, as they choose the former 
option. The choice seems to come down to being too much of a bureaucrat 
or too much of a utopian.  
In cases like the one at hand, we test the limits of TWAIL's division into two 
– or more – subgroups that supposedly have distinctive characteristics and 
different approaches.58 After all, TWAILers from both (or more) generations 
share the same objective – namely, to build an equal world that is neither 
insensitive nor negative to the South. In order to achieve this objective, one 
is not obliged to adopt a sole strategy, and this is all the more true when we 
think of TWAIL as an interdisciplinary movement. TWAILers should keep 
on criticizing the colonial traits of international law, but criticism does not 
preclude effective action under the spaces granted by international law. 
As I have pointed out, it is true that the current architecture of Article 52 of 
the VCLT makes most formal mechanisms for constraining non-military 
coercion barely useful at most. The criticisms formulated against Article 52 
and the demands for its revision are all well-warranted. Political action is still 
the main mechanism for the outlawing of non-military coercion as an 
instrument in treaty negotiations.59 However, TWAILers should not refrain 
from trying to exploit the small leeway that is available. Shadow reporting to 
human rights bodies, highlighting the incongruences of traditional 
institutions of international law, cooperating with non-governmental and 
civil organizations, using internal mechanisms to report governmental abuse 
– these are some of the parallel tracks that may be used to mount a challenge 
against a narrow interpretation of coercion.  
Moreover, TWAILers should not refrain from taking up the task of using 
mainstream reasoning against mainstream actors. The doubts over 
methodological originality and specificity60 should not hinder TWAILers in 
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pursuing their objective. TWAILers must wage legal arguments as political 
instruments to foster dissent and to bring about change in international 
relations.61 
In this sense, as the ILC has indicated that Article 52 may embrace other 
interpretations, TWAILers should strive to make this recognition of an 
opening pay off. Treaty interpretation, after all, involves its own politics and 
allows as such for different solutions based on different methods none of 
which is exclusively correct.62 Firstly, TWAILers should not fall into the trap 
of affirming that all exceptions must be interpreted restrictively (exceptio est 
strictissimae interpretationis). It is clear that the clause on coercion of the State 
should also be given an effective interpretation, as it safeguards fundamental 
values.63 
Secondly, TWAILers may subvert the idea of restrictive interpretation in 
their favor, as it stands as a technique that can safeguard sovereignty. If the 
right to enter into treaties and to be bound by them amounts to the exercise 
of a sovereign prerogative, as the Lotus and Wimbledon cases have pointed out, 
the right to be bound only by a treaty to which full consent was given is also a 
sovereign prerogative. In this sense, when Articles 2.1.f and 2.1.g of the VCLT 
refer to 'a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty', a narrow 
interpretation would displace cases in which the treaty was effectively 
imposed. 
Finally, a teleological interpretation of Article 52 of the VCLT also evinces 
the central role that consent plays in the conclusion of treaties, so much so 
that validity should be considered to depend on it. It should be up to 
detractors of this view to demonstrate both why setting aside non-military 
coercion and distinguishing it from military coercion is justifiable and how 
true consent is preserved in these contexts.
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